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Johnson: Title IX

THE EVOLUTION OF TITLE IX:
PROSPECTS FOR EQUALITY
IN INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS
Christina Johnson*
The American sportswoman has begun to achieve recognition for her participation in an arena historically reserved for
the male athlete. Sport has long been a primary socializing agent
that has emphasized the stereotypic masculine model of competition, power, and dominance. l This model is culturally per* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law
1. See, e.g., Oglesby, The MasculinitylFeminity Game: Called on Account of

. . . . ,in WOMEN AND SPORT: FROM MYTH TO REALITY 75,82 (C. Oglesby ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN AND SPORT] (citing Felshin, Sport, Style, and Social Mode, J.
PHYSICAL EDUCATION RECREATION 31, 46 (1975), which makes the argument that sport is
a primary social mode for stereotypic sexuality. "While hunting, politics, religion, and
commerce may playa role, sport and warfare are consistently the chief cement of men's
house comradery." K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLmcs 48 (Virago Paperback ed. 1969).
"[C]ertain play-forms may be used consciously or unconsciously to cover up some social
or political design." J. HmZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN CULTURE 205 (Beacon Paperback ed. 1955). Commentators emphasize sport as a "masculine
rite of passage":
In its social definition it is obvious that sport in the United
States serves as a masculine rite of passage. It could not be a
vehicle for socialization into manhood except that the idealized values invested in sport symbolically and socially have
important masculine connotations. This may be so because
men played more important roles in establishing both society
and sport, or because men are simply more important in a social view; in any case, the assumption of sport as masculine is
a basic aspect of it as a symbolic formulation of ideal values.
F. GERBER, J. FELSHIN, P. BERLIN & W. WYRICK, THE AMERICAN WOMEN IN SPORT 182
(1974).
The stereotypic model is taught and reinforced very early. Stein & Smithells, Age
and Sex Differences in Children's Sex Role Standards About Achievement, 1969 DEV.
PSYCH. 252, cited in Duquin, The Androgynous Advantage, in WOMEN AND SPORT, supra,
at 93.
The perceived relation between sport and the quality of life in
American society is central to an understanding of the
predominantly male-oriented tenor of both the sports creed
and of sports activities in America. Sports are seen as primary
vehicles for enculturating the youth who will 'be the future
custodians of the republic,' in the words of the late General
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ceived as appropriate for men but basically inconsistent with the
female role. 2 During the past ten years, women have emerged to
shatter this stereotype by demonstrating their athJetic abilities
in all levels of comp"etition. Their achievement, most notably in
the area of intercollegiate athletics, has resulted in controversy
regarding the proper governing structure for women's athletics.3
MacArthur. In America, roles involving the establishment and
maintenance of security, leadership, control, and other instrumental functions are typically reserved for males. Therefore,
given the claimed relation between sport and the greater society, it is to be expected that the focus will be upon males, with
females being more or less ignored and excluded from the
claimed benefits of sports.
H. EDWARDS, SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 100 (1973).
2. See Horner, Toward an Understanding of Achievement-Related Conflicts in Women, in WOMEN AND ACHIEVEMENT, SOCIAL AND MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS 207, 207-08 (M.
Mednick, S. Tangri & L. Hoffman eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN AND ACHIEVEMENT]. Horner finds that traditional notions of femininity continue to affect young men
and women:
The prevalent image of women found throughout history,
amidst both scholarly and popular circles, has with few exceptions converged on the idea that femininity and individual
achievements which reflect intellectual competence or leadership potential are desirable but mutually exclusive goals. The
aggressive, and by implication, masculine qualities inherent in
a capacity for mastering intellectual problems, attacking difficulties, and making final decisions are considered fundamentally antagonistic to or incompatible with femininity. Since
the time of Freud's treatise on the "Psychology of Women,"
the essence of femininity has been equated with the absence
or "the repression of [their] aggressiveness, which is imposed
upon women by their constitutions and by society" [Freud,
1933, p. 158].
. . . It is clear in our data • • • that the young men and
women tested over the past seven years still tend to evaluate
themselves and to behave in ways consistent with the dominant stereotype that says competition, independence, competence, intellectual achievement, and leadership reflect positively on mental health and masculinity but are basically
inconsistent or in conflict with femininity.

[d.
3. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has been engaged in a
struggle for control of women's intercollegiate athletics. On January 13, 1981, the NCAA
voted to sponsor women's championships in Division I, which includes those colleges and
universities having the m9st extensive and costly programs. As a result, approximately
215 women will be placed on key committees like the NCAA Council, Executive Committee and Infraction Committee. In January, 1980, the NCAA voted to sponsor five women's championships for Divisions II and III beginning in the 1981-82 season. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 14, 1981, at 61, col. 1. Division II colleges and universities have
programs that are intermediate in size and cost, and Division III colleges have much
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Despite significant advances during the last decade, the sportswoman continues to face social and legal challenges in the
eighties.
Enactment of Title IX. of the Education Amendments of
1972' enhanced the opportunity for women to participate in intercollegiate sports, yet complaints of sex discrimination continue to grow. G Although there has been a dramatic increase in
smaller athletic programs overall. u.s. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MORE HURDLES To
CLEAR 21 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MORE HURDLES To CLEAR]. The attempt by the
NCAA to take over the AIAW sparked considerable controversy regarding control of intercollegiate athletics. The issue is whether intercollegiate sports programs should be
governed by separate organizations as they have been up until recently, or by a unified
governing organization. The Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW),
established in 1971, has been successfully sponsoring women's intercollegiate athletics
and has continually emphasized the importance of academic as well as athletic achievement. Some members of the AIAW regard the NCAA action as counterproductive to the
AIAW philosophy of sport, as well as to the continuing growth of women's athletics. See
Wheeler, NCAA v. AIAW, WOMEN'S SPORTS, June 1980, at 20. The Women's Sports
Foundation, in expressing their support for the AIAW, stated:
Historically, women have not had a significant role in intercollegiate athletic governance; intercollegiate athletics has
been synonymous with men's athletics. Only in the last decade, with the creation of the AIAW as the women's intercollegiate athletic governing organization and the advent of Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, has our society begun to broaden its definition of athletics to include women.
Even now it remains common to refer to "athletics" and
"women's athletics," as though the generic term were male
and including women required a modifier. One of the prime
effects of the NCAA's proposal to govern women'!, athletics
may be to perpetuate the second-class citizenship of women in
the athletic establishment.
The record of the NCAA with respect to women speaks
for itself. It has opposed, at every opportunity, the passage
and implementation of federal legislation dealing with equal
opportunity for women in college athletics.
Women's Sports Foundation, Down to the Wire: AIAW and NCAA, WOMEN'S SPORTS,
Jan. 1981, at 60.
4. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686
(1976». Title IX provides that: "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . ••" For a discussion of Title IX's application to intercollegiate athletics, see
Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 34 (1977); Kadzielski, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Change or Continuity?, 6 J.L. &
EDuc. 183 (1977); Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IOWA L.
REv. 420 (1975); Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some
Muscle on Title IX, 88 YALE L.J. 1254 (1979) [hereinafter cited as YALE Note].
5. As of June 15, 1980, the Department of Education had received more than 130
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women's participation,6 confusion and criticism regarding the
practical application of Title IX continue to stall efforts by
many sportswomen to participate with the same degree of institutional support afforded to men,? Equal opportunity in intercollegiate athletics can be strengthened by clarifying the mandates of Title IX, affirmative action by intercollegiate athletic
programs, and successful litigation on behalf of those athletes
who are denied their rights under both Title IX and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution,
This Comment will analyze the development of Title IX, as
it affects female athletes, from its inception in 1972 to the publication by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW)8 of the final policy interpretation in December of 1979,9
In particular, the final policy will be carefully scrutinized to determine whether it is consistent with and, more specifically, how
well it serves the important public policy goals which informed
the statute,lO Although the analysis will reveal weaknesses in
complaints against 80 colleges and universities alleging sex discrimination in athletics.
Title IX Enforcement Begins Soon, 17 NCAA NEWS, June 15, 1980, at 1.
6. According to 1980 statistics compiled by the Women's Sports Foundation, 50% of
all college athletes are female, an increase of 250% in 10 years. Although the number of
sports offered women students has increased markedly since 1973-74 (from an average of
2.5 to 5 sports per institution), the number of sports available to men in 1978-79 was an
average of 48 percent higher. MORE llURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 24.
7. Colleges and universities continue to spend a disproportionately larger amount on
men's athletics. During 1978-79, the average per capita expenditures for male athletes at
institutions belonging to both the NCAA (Division I), and the AIAW was $5,257, more
than double the $2,156 allocated for each female athlete. These universities spend an
average of 14.3% of their total athletic budgets on women's athletics even though women
constitute 28.9% of the athletes. MORE HURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 29. In 197778 one major university was reported to have budgeted approximately $5 million for
men's athletics but only $180,000 for women's athletics. Roach, Is Title IX Scoring
Many Points In Field of Women's Sports?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1977, at 51, col. 1.
8. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare became two separate departments (Department of Education and Department of Health and Human Services) on
May 4,1980. Pub. L. No. 96-88, §§ 301, 506, 93 Stat. 677, 692 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§
3441, 3503 (Supp. III 1979». Because this Comment analyzes regulations and policies
issued by HEW, this name will be used throughout the discussion unless reference is
made to developments specifically occuring after May 4, 1980. Soon after inauguration,
President Reagan stated that he "plans to abolish" the Department of Education. Wall
St. J., Jan. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). The poliey interpretation reflects HEW's interpretation of the intercollegiate athletic provisions of Title IX and its implementing
regulations.
10. See note 14 infra and accompanying text, for discussion of legislative history.
Women's Law Forum
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HEW's policy, specific remedies are suggested which will aid in
ensuring equal opportunity for intercollegiate sportswomen.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Title IX provides in pertinent part that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance ...."11 This language, specifically modeled
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964/2 was designed to
expand the earlier statute's prohibition against discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any federally
assisted program. IS Legislative history makes clear that Title IX
was prompted by a pervasive pattern of sex discrimination in all
levels of education. I. Title IX's specific effect on and application
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). "Approximately 20,000 school districts and higher education institutions receive financial assistance from programs administered by HEW and
now by ED [the Department of Education]. The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is responsible for monitoring their enforcement with Title IX .••• " U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, ENFORCING TrrLE IX, at 7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ENFORCING TITLE IX].
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Title VI provides that "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal assistance."
13. Originally Title IX was intended to amend Title VI by simply adding the word
"sex." 117 CONGo REC. 9821-23 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Green) • "This is identical language specifically taken from Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act • . • ." 117 CONGo
REc. 30407 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted
programs and activities is already prohibited by Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition
does not apply to discrimination on the basis of sex. In order
to close this loophole, my amendment sets forth a prohibition
and enforcement provisions which generally parallel the provisions of Title VI.
118 CONGo REc. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). HEW concurs:
• • • Except for certain specific exemptions not directly
pertinent to athletics, paragraph 901(a) of Title IX is virtually
identical to paragraph 601(a) of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Since the language of Title IX so closely parallels
that of Title VI, in the absence of specific Congressional Indications to the contrary, the Department has basically interpreted Title IX consistently with interpretations of Title VI in
similar areas.
40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
14. See generally Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R.
16,098 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination Hear-
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to intercollegiate athletics is less clear, because ~thletics are
never specifically mentioned in the statute itself. Senator Birch
Bayh, sponsor of the bill, referred to athletics only twice during
congressional debates on the subject. 15 One of these statements,
which most clearly reflects Title IX's coverage of intercollegiate
sports, also foreshadows the later controversy regarding integrated teams:
I do not read [Title IX] as requiring integration of dormitories between the sexes, nor do I
feel it mandates the desegregation of football
fields. What we are trying to do is provide equal
access for women and men students to the educational process and the extracurricular activities in
a school, where there is not a unique facet such as
football involved. We are not requiring that intercollegiate football be desegregated nor that the
men's locker room be desegregated. 16

That Title IX was intended to apply to intercollegiate athletics became clear when several proposed bills and amendments, seeking to exempt revenue-producing sports from the
statute, were defeated. The first was introduced by Senator John
Tower of Texas on May 20, 1974.1'1 His amendment provided, in
incs]. Representative Edith Green of Oregon, who later sponsored Title IX on the floor
of the House during the debates in 1971 and 1972, was chairperson of the hearings. Testimony from the hearings indicates that educational institutions were the primary focus
of complaints concerning sex discrimination. The hearings were relied upon in both
houses during the subsequent debates on Title IX.
In the summer of 1970, Representative Edith Green, chairman
of the House Special Subcommittee on Education, held extensive hearings on discrimination and related areas • • . Over
1,200 pages of testimony document the massive, persistent
patterns of discrimination against women in the academic
world. Yet despite a situation which approaches national scandal, the problem has gone unnoticed for years.
118 CONGo REc. 5804-06 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). "Discrimination in education is
one of the most damaging injustices women suffer. It denies them equal education and
equal employment opportunity, contributing to a second class self image." CONGo REc.
30406 (1971) (quoting THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS
AND REsPONSmILITIES (April 1970».
15. 117 CONGo REc. 30407 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (no requirements that intercollegiate football be desegregated); 118 CONGo REc. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Bayh) (personal privacy in sports facilities must be maintained).
16. 117 CONGo REC. 30407 (1971).
17. S. 1539, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 536, 120 CONGo REc. 15,477 (1974) (as passed by
Senate). See Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st
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part, that Title IX "shall not apply to an intercollegiate athletic
activity to the extent that such activity does or may provide
gross receipts or donation to the institution necessary to support
that activity."1S The Tower amendment was subsequently deleted by the conference committee on the Education Amendments of 197419 and replaced by what has become known as the
"Javits Amendment."20 This amendment provides in pertinent
part as follows:
Sess. 47 (1975); Prohibition of Sex Discrimination Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975):
Mr. Chairman, it is interesting to me that in the midst of the
highly vocal debate now going on whether or not Title IX
should apply to either revenue producing sports in particular,
or intercollegiate athletics in general, no one is making the argument that there is not discrimination against women. No
football coach or athletic director is denying that there is
something fundamentally wrong with a college or university
that relegates its female athletes to second rate facilities, second rate equipment, or second rate schedules, solely because
they are women. No one seriously disputes the fact that athletic budgets for women are a fraction of those provided for
men. Instead, the argument has focused on the ability of certain intercollegiate sports to withstand the financial burdens
imposed by the equal opportunity requirements of Title IX.
To this end, those who feel such sports as football could not
survive such financial strictures are seeking to exempt these
sports from the mandates of Title IX, through the Tower bill,
S.2106.
As the Senate author of Title IX, Mr. Chairman, I am opposed
to the Tower bill, not because I am oblivious to the economic
concerns of those members of the NCAA opposing Title IX,
but because I think their COncern is based upon a misunderstanding of both what is required under the Title IX regulations and the true implications of the Tower proposal.
Id. at 46-47 (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
It is clear that the amendments seeking to exclude revenue-producing sports from the
scope of Title IX were prompted, in part, by the concern that funds derived from such
sports as football and basketball would be diverted to the women's program. There is,
however, no evidence to support this contention.
Many men's athletic departments have expressed concern that
funds to increase athletic opportunities for women would have
to be taken from the men's program, adversely affecting other
men's sports. The data presented in this and the previous
chapters show, however, that men's budgets have increased
substantially in the past five years and that men's programs
continue to be considerably larger than women's programs.
MORE HURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 30.
18. S. 1539, 93d Congo 2d Sess., §v536, 120 CONGo REC. 15477 (1974).
19. S. REP. No. 1026, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo &
An. NEWS 4271.
20. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 "(1974).
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The secretary of HEW shall prepare and pubJish
. . . proposed regulations implementing the provisions of Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 relating to the prohibition of sex discrimination in federally assisted education programs
which shall include with respect to intercollegiate
athletic activities reasonable provisions considering the nature of the particular SpOrts.21

Following the Javits Amendment, other proposed amendments attempted to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title
IX;22 these amendments died in committee. Additionally, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina introduced two bills designed
to remove intercollegiate athletics from consideration under the
statute. Neither bill passed.23 In light of these unsuccessful congressional efforts to restrict the scope of Title IX, it is clear Congress perceived and intended the statute to cover intercollegiate
athletic programs.24 Moreover, Congress failed to disapprove
21. Id.

22. Representative O'Hara introduced a bill which sought to allow revenue-producing sports to use their profits to maintain their own teams before diverting them to other
men's and women's teams. The bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education. The bill died in committee. See H. R. 8394, 94th Congo 1st Sess.,
121 CONGo REc. 21685 (1974). On July 15, 1975, Senators Tower, Bartlett, and Hruska cosponsored a bill which again sought to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title IX.
According to Sen. Tower, "[t]he purpose of our amendment ... is to limit HEW's authority [in such an event] to aspects of intercollegiate sports programs other than the
revenues produced by and used for individual sports activities." See S. 2106, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 121 CONGo REc. 22778 (1975). Although the Senate Subcommittee on Education
considered one amendment in hearings on September 16 and 18, 1975, it also died in
committee. See 43 Fed. Reg. 18,774 (1978).
23. S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONGo REc. 23736 (1975), 43 Fed. Reg. 18,774
(1978). On January 31, 1977, Senator Helms reintroduced previous S. 2146 as S. 535. The
bill would have prohibited federal agencies from enforcing regulations pertaining to athletics where participation in those athletic activities was not a required part of the curriculum of an educational institution. See S. 535, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
24. See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council V. Schultz, 443 F.2d. 689,
706 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (positive action by Congress rejecting limiting amendments reflects
a clear purpose to which the court may refer in determining legislative intent); Gaal &
DiLorenzo, Legality and Requirements of HEW's Proposed Policy Interpretation of Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, J. COLL. & U.L. 6 (1979) (unsuccessful attempts to
exclude athletics from Title IX are evidence of congressional intent that athletics be
covered); "If Title IX is inapplicable to intercollegiate sports, the Javits amendment
would be a nullity. Even the Tower amendment presumes coverage for all but revenueproducing sports." Cox, supra note 4, at 36 n.15. See also YALE Note, supra note 4, at
1255 n.15 which states that: "[i]t can hardly be disputed that the statute includes athletics by its terms and the subsequent legislative history leaves no doubt that this interpretation was intended." But see Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside
HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49 (1976) (because athletic programs are not programs
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HEW's Title IX. regulations which specifically encompass
sports. 25
HEW has the authority to issue regulations concerning athletics and to ensure they are implemented.26 Title IX. provides
that the regulations must effectuate the purpose of the statute
in educational programs or activities that receive federal
financial assistance. 27 Legislative his~ory clearly indicates that
the goal of the statute is elimination of sex discrimination in educational institutions that receive federal funds. HEW interprets
the statutory mandate to mean that a program "will be subject
to the requirements of the regulation if it receives or benefits
from federal assistance . . . ."28 Federal financial assistance is
defined as any grant or loan by the government to the educational institution that may then be used for anything from restoor activities which receive direct financial assistance within the meaning of the statute,
they are exempt from HEW regulation).
25. See 43 Fed. Reg. 18,774 (1978), which notes:
"Under Section 431(d) and (f) of the General Education Provisions Act; HEW was required to submit any Title IX regulation to Congress for review 45 days before its effective date.
During the 45-day period, the law allows Congress, by concurrent resolution, to disapprove the regulation in whole or in
part."
Though several resolutions were considered, they were ultimately rejected by the House
Postsecondary Education Subcommittee. But see Gaal, & DiLoremo supra note 24, at
166 n.30, which asserts that failure of Congress to disapprove regulations, although indirect evidence of congressional intent, may not be construed as approval of regulations.
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). The section provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to
extend Federal financial assistance to any education program
or activity, by way of grant, loan or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of section 1681 [20 U.S.C. Section
1681] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which
the action is taken.
27. [d.
28. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
Under analogous cases involving constitutional prohibitions
against racial discrimination, the courts have held that the education functions of a school district or college include any
service, facility, activity or program which it operates or sponsors, including athletics and other extracurricular activities.
These precedents have been followed with regard to sex discrimination .•••
[d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 2

768

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:759

ration to scholarships.29 According to HEW, intercollegiate athletics are clearly educational programs or activities that receive
federal financial assistance. 3o Although the athletic programs
may not receive direct assistance, they are still subject to Title
IX's broad prohibition against sex discrimination if they benefit
from federal funds. 31 If an educational institution fails to comply
29. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,137 (1975):
Federal financial assistance means any of the following, when
authorized or extended under a law administered by the
Department:
(1) A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds made available for:
(i) The acquisition, construction, renovation, restoration or repair of a building or facility or any portion
thereof; and
(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other
funds extended to any entity for payment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity, or extended directly to such students for payments to that entity.
(2) A grant of Federal real or personal property or any
interest therein, including surplus property, and the proceeds
of the sale or transfer of such property, if the Federal share of
the fair market value of the property is not, upon such sale or
transfer, properly accounted for to the Federal Government.
(3) Provision of the services of Federal personnel.
(4) Sale or lease of Federal property or any interest
therein at nominal consideration, or at consideration reduced
for the purpose of assisting the recipient or in recognition of
public interest to be served thereby, or permission to use Federal property or any interest therein without consideration.
(5) Any other contract, agreement or arrangement which
has as one of its purposes the provision of assistance to any
education program or activity, except a contract of insurance
of guaranty.
[d.

In our opinion, a revenue-producing intercollegiate athletic
program is (a) an education program or activity within the
meaning of Title IX, and (b) an integral part of the general
undergraduate education program of an institution of higher
education. Accordingly, in our opinion, an institution of higher
education must comply with the prohibition against sex discrimination imposed by that title and its implementing regulations in the administration of any revenue-producing intercollegiate athletic activity if either the athletic activity or the
general education program of which the athletic activity is a
part is receiving Federal financial assistance.
Memorandum of F. Peter Libassi, HEW General Counsel, reprinted in 43 Fed Reg.
58,075 (1978).
31. HEW derives authority for its "benefiting" approach from Bob Jones Univ. v.
Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd. mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975). The
district court held that direct payments to veterans under federal assistance statutes
30.
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with the regulatory provisions of Title IX, federal financial assisconstituted federal financial assistance to the university under Title VI. The court listed
three reasons for this conclusion:
(1) [p]ayments to veterans enrolled at approved schools
serve to defray the costs of the educational program of the
schools thereby releasing institutional funds which would, in
the absence of federal assistance, be spent on the student. • •
(2) [t]he participation of veterans who-but for the availability of federal funds-would not enter the educational programs of the approved school, benefits the school by enlarging
the pool of qualified applicants upon which it can draw for its
educational program • • • , and
(3) [t]he historical development of federal educational
benefits for veterans persuasively indicates that the statutes in
question are covered in Title VI.
396 F. Supp. at 602-03. The court further noted that "[a]lthough the VA payments are
not earmarked for school related expenditures, e.g., tuition, all that is necessary for Title
VI purposes is a showing that the infusion of federal money through payments to veterans assists the educational program of the approved school." Id. at 603 n.22. The court
based its finding of discrimination under Title VI on the university's refusal to admit
"unmarried nonwhites" due to their belief that "intergration of the student body would
lead to inter-racial marriage thereby violating God's command." Id. at 600. The court
found that the admissions policy constituted discrimination in a program which received
federal financial assistance. See Gaal & DiLorenzo, supra note 24, at 170-71 (courts recognize role of athletics in overall educational program); 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975):
Section 86.11 in Subpart B, provides that the regulation applies 'to each education program or activity which receives or
benefits from Federal financial assistance' administered by the
Department. Under analogous cases involving constitutional
prohibitions against racial discrimination, the courts have held
that the education functions of a school district or college include any service, facility, activity or program which it operates or sponsors, including athletics and other extracurricular
activities. These precedents have been followed with regard to
sex discrimination • • • •
Id.
But see Note, Title IX Se:c Discrimination Regulations: Impact on Private Education,
65 Ky. L.J. 656, 686 (1977), in which the author maintains that HEW cannot rely on Bob
Jones as authority for the contention that "money given to one entity within the university frees money to be used elsewhere ••••"
The district court for the Eastern District of Michigan recently held that Title IX
"extends only to those education programs or activities which receive direct financial
assistance." Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (Memorandum Opinion and Order on file at the Golden Gate University Law Review Office.).
The amended complaint alleged the school board had violated Title IX, as well as two
state statutes, by excluding plaintiff's daughters from the Pioneer High School golf team.
Id. at 2. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the refusal by the school to provide a
"separate boys' and girls' golf team was a denial of [plaintiff's] daughters' rights to equal
education opportunities." Id. Although the school board subsequently formed a separate
golf team for girls, the court considered whether plaintiff could have prevailed under
Title IX in order to resolve the remaining claim for attorney fees. Id. at 4. The primary
issue was whether Title IX mandates an institutional approach, in which case it would
apply to any institution receiving federal funds regardless of whether these funds go
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tance may be withdrawn, S2 although Congress retains the right
to review and reject any proposed cut-off within thirty days of
the decision to terminate. ss Any decision by HEW to terminate
public assistance is subject to judicial review.Sf
Title IX provides that termination or refusal of funds for
failure to comply with the statute "shall be limited in its effect
to the particular program or activity or part thereof in which
noncompliance has been found. "S5 HEW reads this language as
giving it authority to terminate any federal funds received by a
directly to the athletic program, or a programmatic approach which essentially requires
that a specific program, to be subject to Title IX, must receive direct federal funding. In
reaching its conclusion that the statute mandates a programmatic approach, the court
totally discounted earlier case interpretations construing Title VI. The court distinguished these cases by finding that racial discrimination affects all educational programs
and activities while sex discrimination is perceived as affecting only the specific athletic
program under attack. This assessment fails to acknowledge or consider the legislative
history of Title IX. See Sex Discrimination Hearings, supra note 14 and accompanying
text. Additionally, discrimination in the athletic program may only be a "surface indicator of a broader based pattern or policy of sex discrimination at the university." Gaal &
DiLorenzo, supra note 24, at 172. See also note 47 infra and accompanying text.
At least two recent district court decisions found that a university will be subject to
Title IX even though federal funds may not go directly to the organizations or programs
under review. See Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Califano, 597 F.Supp. 590 (S.D. Fla. 1980);
Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Penn. 1980.) HEW athletic regulations require Title IX compliance in every program and activity administered by a university which receives or benefits from federal funds. Even when the only form of funding is federally guaranteed student loans, under Grove City, the university will be subject
to the requirements of Title IX. These cases reflect the legislative purpose behind Title
IX and are consistent with HEW's interpretation of the statute. The conclusion reached
in Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., supra, by contrast, contradicts the construction
placed on Title IX by most authorities.
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this
section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity
to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding
on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to
comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal
shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part
thereof, or other recipient as to whom such finding has been
made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been
so found. • • •
•
Id.
33.Id.
34. Id. § 1683.
35. Id. § 1682. For full text of the provision, see note 32 supra.
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school when that school violates Title IX.36 Thus, if a school's
intercollegiate athletics program runs afoul of Title IX regulations or guidelines, HEW has the power to terminate federal
funds received by the athletic program as well as funds received
by any other school programs that are found to be tainted by
the discrimination in the athletic program.3 '1
HEW relies on Board of Public Instruction v. Finch38 for
this interpretation, despite the fact that the specific holding of
Finch does not support HEW's reading of the statute. In Finch,
the Fifth Circuit reviewed an order of HEW cutting off all federal funds received by the school district because of a violation
of Title VI.39 To determine whether HEW had the authority to
terminate funds for three different school programs,40 the court
construed a provision of Title VI that is virtually identical to
that of Title IX.41 The court held that the term "program" did
36. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
Title IX requires in 20 U.S.C. 1682 that termination or refusal
to grant or continue assistance 'shall be limited in its effect to
the particular education program or activity or part thereof in
which noncompliance has been found.' The interpretation of
this provision in Title IX will be consistent with the interpretation of similar language contained in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d-1). Therefore, an education program or activity or part thereof operated by a recipient of Federal financial assistance administered by the Department will be subject to the requirements of this regulation
if it receives or benefits from such assistance. This interpretation is consistent with the only case specifically ruling on the
language contained in Title VI, which holds that Federal
funds may be terminated under Title VI upon a finding that
they 'are infected by a discriminatory environment . . • .'
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969).
37. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
38. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
39. ld. at 1071. When meetings between HEW and school officials failed to remedy
the problem, General Counsel for HEW initiated administrative proceedings which confirmed the school district's failure to comply with the Title VI regulations and implementing guidelines. Based on this determination, HEW entered an order terminating
federal financial assistance to the school district.
40. ld. at 1074. "Three separate and distinct federal programs are here involved.
One concerns federal aid for the education of children of low income families; one involves grants for supplementary educational centers; the third provides special grants for
the education of adults who have not received a college education." ld.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). The statute provides:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this
section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity
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not mean "school program" as HEW contended.42 Rather, "program" means "a particular program, within a state, within a
county, within a district, even within a school"43 which is covered by an individual grant statute (a congressional statute authodzing funding to specific school programs). The court concluded that in terminating funds, HEW must review each
individual program for discrimination and "must make findings
of fact indicating either that a particular program is itself administered in a discriminatory manner, or is so affected by discriminatory practices elsewhere in' the school system that it
thereby becomes discriminatory."44
Dicta in Finch, however, does lend support to HEW's position that it has broad authority to terminate funds under Title
IX. The Finch court, for example, noted that if funds provided
by a grant "support a program which is infected by a discriminato any recipient or to whom there has been an express finding
on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to
comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal
shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part
thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been
made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been
so found .•••
Finch is the only case thus far to rule on the language of this provision.
42. 414 F.2d at 1077.
We must also reject HEW's interpretation of the term "program" as that term is used in the statute. While it is true as
HEW points out that during the Senate debate on Section 602
of the Act (42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000d-1) fears were expressed
that termination of aid to schools might also lead to termination of aid to roads and highways, see 110 Congo Rec. 7059
(1964); 110 Congo Rec. 7067 (1964), such expressions of concern do not mark the inner limits of the term 'program'. In the
first place the statute requires that termination be limited 'to
the particular program, or part thereof' [emphasis added]
found not in compliance with the Act. Even if 'program'
meant school program, as HEW contends, some meaning
would have to be assigned to the parenthetical phrase, 'or part
thereof.' The logical candidate would be the individual grant
statutes which constitute the so-called 'school program.'
[d.

43. 414 F.2d at 1078. The language "even within a school" (emphasis added)-considered with other language in the opinion-suggests that the range of activities covered by the term "program" broadens as the unit under examination narrows.
See notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text.
44. 414 F.2d at 1079.
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tory environment," then HEW has the power to terminate those
funds. 415 The court also cautioned that, in demanding a program
by program review of discrimination, "we do not mean to indicate that a program must be considered in isolation from its context."46 The point at which one discriminating program will be
found to infect another is unclear but one commentator suggests
that "discrimination in an intercollegiate program infects both
the physical education program and the general education program."47 HEW's interpretation of Finch serves to enhance its
own regulatory power to effectuate the purposes of Title IX.
II. THE REGULATIONS

A. THE

PROPOSED REGULATIONS

On June 20, 1974, HEW issued its proposed regulations.48
Section 86.38 of the regulations bars discrimination on the basis
of sex in a recipient institution's physical education and athletic
45. ld. at 1078. But see Kuhn, supra note 24, at 68-70 (HEW has expanded the
infection theory beyond the scope permitted by court in Finch); NCAA v. Califano, 622
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1980) (challenging HEW's interpretation and implementation of
Title IX). In YALE Note, supra note 4, at 1256 n.15, the author contends that "despite
these challenges, it seems likely that HEW's interpretations will be upheld, since its approach to Title IX parallels its interpretation of a similar provision in Title VI •..•"
46. 414 F.2d at 1078-79.
.
47. Gaal & DiLorenzo, supra note 24, at 172. Gaal and DiLorenzo justify this statement as follows:
As noted above, it is generally accepted that the intercollegiate athletic program is an integral part of the general educational program. The infectious impact of discrimination in
athletic programs is not difficult to visualize. Such discrimination is likely to deter any woman serious about athletics from
enrolling at the discriminating institution. Additionally, potential female students may well view discrimination in athletics as a surface indicator of a broader based pattern or policy
of sex discrimination at the university. In either event, athletic
discrimination, by influencing general admissions, might be
construed as infecting the overall educational program.
ld. The Department's views are stated at 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975):
Paragraph 86.41(a) provides that athletics must be operated
without discrimination on the basis of sex. The Department
continues to take the position that athletics constitute an integral part of the educational processes of schools and colleges
and, as such, are fully subject to the requirements of Title IX
even in the absence of Federal funds going directly to
athletics.
(Emphasis added.)
48. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974).
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programs.49 HEW cites Brenden v. Independent School District
742,110 as authority in asserting general Title IX jurisdiction over
such athletic programs. lSI In Brenden, two female high school
students were not allowed to participate in interscholastic tennis, cross-county skiing, and cross-country running. They sued
the school district under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.1S2 Plaintiffs alleged that the league rulelSs prevented them from playing
on the existing boys' teams in these sports even though the girls
could compete effectively on these teams.54 No separate team
was provided for girls by their schools in these sports. ISIS The district court cited Title IX as evidence of congressional intent "to
eliminate discrimination based on stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes."ISS In affirming the district court's decision, the
Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs must be allowed to participate
on their school's teams, and enjoined the high school league
from imposing sanctions on the high schools for compliance with
the order.1S7 The court based its decision, in part, on the findings
of the President's Task Force on Women's Rights lS8 and on testi49. [d. at 22,230.
50. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
51. 39 Fed. Reg. at 22,230 (1974).
52. 477 F.2d at 1294. Cases brought under the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution are filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The statute offers a right of
action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti.
tution and laws ..• " of the United States.
53. The Minnesota State High School League rule stated: "Girls shall be prohibited
from participation in the boys' interscholastic athletic program either as a member of the
boys' team or a member of the girls' team playing the boys' team." 477 F.2d at 1294.
54. [d.
55. [d.
56. [d. at 1296.
57. Quoting the district court, the Eighth Circuit stated:
In summary, the Court is confronted with a situation where
two high school girls wish to take part in certain interscholastic boys' athletics; where it is shown that the girls could compete effectively on those teams; and where there are no alternative competitive programs sponsored by their schools which
would provide an equal opportunity for competition for these
girls; and where the rule, in its application, becomes unreasonable in light of the objectives which the rule seeks to promote.
Brought to its base, then, Peggy Brenden and Tony St. Pierre
are being prevented from participating in the boys' interscholastic teams in tennis, cross-country, and cross-country skiing
solely on the basis of the fact of sex and sex alone.
[d. at 1294.
58. 477 F.2d at 1298. See note 14 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
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mony from the Sex Discrimination Hearings. 1I9 One author notes
that "Brenden therefore reflected the new national policy
against sex discrimination in education."60
The proposed regulations, reflecting the holding in Brenden,
included specific procedures designed to eliminate sex discrimination in intercollegiate athletic programs.61 Perhaps the most
promising feature of the regulation-later deleted from the final
version-was the requirement that the recipient institutions affirmatively attempt to accommodate the interests and abilities
of women.62 Section 86.38(c)63 defined affirmative efforts as 1)
informing women of their opportunity to participate in athletics,
and 2) providing them with support and training designed to enhance their athletic abilities.M As part of the affirmative action
mandate, HEW required each institution to make an annual assessment of those sports in which members of each sex wanted
to participate.611 One commentator has stated that, "[b]y making
the interests of the student body, and particularly female students, the primary determinant of which sports would be sponsored, the [proposed] regulation would have revolutionized intercollegiate athletics."66 The affirmative action section was the
most dramatic indication of HEW's determination to implement
the goals of Title IX.
HEW solicited comments from interested individuals and
organizations67 soon after the Office for Civil Rights68 gave notice of the proposed regulations. HEW received nearly 10,000 rethis report.
59. 477 F.2d at 1298. See note 14 supra and accompanying text for summary of
content of hearings. In delineating the widespread practice of discrimination against women, the Sex Discrimination Hearings were an important influence on Congress in enacting Title IX.
60. See Todd, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEx L. REv. 103, 107 (1974). "Thus, Brenden may
provide the foundation on which the first cases decided under Title IX will build." Id.
61. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,230 (1974).
62. Id. at 22,236.
63.Id.
64.Id.
65.Id.
66. Cox, supra note 4, at 52.
67. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
68. OCR is responsible for the enforcement of Title IX. See note 169 infra and accompanying text.
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sponses. 69 The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
urged that intercollegiate revenue-producing sports be exempt
from Title IX.70 Although HEW did not adopt this proposal, it
did delete the affirmative efforts requirement due to confusion
over how the annual student poll was to be conducted and the
apparent misinterpretation of the provision relating to equal opportunity.71 These deletions indicate the continuing controversy
over the extent to which Title IX will penetrate the tra:ditionally
male-dominated arena of intercollegiate athletics. If affirmative
efforts are no longer required, Title IX's broad prohibition
against sex discrimination may be weakened. A comparison of
the final regulations with the proposed regulations reflects the
impact of the NCAA's lobbying efforts. 72
B.

THE FINAL REGULATIONS

The final regulations became effective on July 21, 1975.78
Section 86.41 sets forth the provisions governing athletics.7• The
69.

A substantial number of comments was received by the Department on the various issues raised concerning the athletic
provisions of the proposed regulation. Numerous comments
were received favoring a proposal submitted by the National
Col)egiate Athletic Association that the revenue earned by
revenue-producing sports be exempted from coverage under
this regulation. Other comments were submitted against this
proposal.
Id. at 24,134.
70. Id. See Sex Discrimination Hearings, supra note 14; YALE Note, supra note 4,
at 1257.
71. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
Paragraph 86.38(c) of the proposed regulation required all recipients sponsoring athletic activities to take certain affirmative efforts with regard to members of the sex for which athletic opportunities have been limited notwithstanding the lack
of any findings of discrimination. Since such a requirement
could be considered "affirmative action," and was somewhat
inconsistent with Section 86.3, it has been deleted.
Id.
72. See Cox, supra note 4, at 63; YALE Note, supra note 4, at 1257. "Impassioned
commentary and lobbying by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and
others however, led HEW to issue significantly narrower final regulations in 1975." Id.
73. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975) (codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 86). The final regulations
specifically authorized a three-year adjustment period for "a recipient which operates or
sponsors interscholastic athletics at the secondary or post-secondary school leveL" Id. at
24,143. This adjustment period ended July 21, 1978.
74. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1980). Section 86.41 of the regulation states:
(a) General. No person shall, on the 'basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be
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section begins with a general prohibition against sex discriminatreated differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club
or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient
shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for
such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates
or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one
sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the
other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex
have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex
must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the
sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this part,
contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey,
football, basketball and other sports the purpose of major activity of which involves bodily contact.
(c) Equal Opportunity. A recipient which operates or
sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members
of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are
available, the Director will consider, among other factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of
members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic
tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and
services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or
unequal expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient
operates or sponsors separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the Director may consider
the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in
assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex.
(d) Adjustment Period. A recipient which operates or
sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics at the elementary school level shall comply fully with
this section as expeditiously as possible but in no event later
than one year from the effective date of this regulation. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics at the secondary or post-secondary school level shall comply fully with this section as
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tion in "any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics offered by recipient" institutions.'15 Subsection (b) allows a college or university to operate sex-segregated teams
when team selection is based on competitive skill.'16 The final
regulations also added an exception for contact sports, which has
since become a controversial aspect of the regulations.'1'1 Separate teams are allowed for boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey,
football, basketball, and other sports that involve bodily contact.'18 Under the regulations, a female athle.te is not allowed to
try out for a contact sports team, despite the fact that her athletic opportunities may have previously been limited in this
sport.'19 These two exceptions exclude many women from participation because competitive skill in team selection is almost always a factor and because contact sports, most notably football
and basketball, comprise the major athletic events at most colleges and universities.
Section 86.41(c) of the final regulations sets forth criteria by
which HEW will measure whether recipient institutions provide
equal opportunity in athletics.8o The first and most important
criterion is "[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodates the interests and abilities of
both sexes ...."81 HEW will consider ten factorss2 to determine
whether this provision has been met. These factors allow HEW
to assess institutional compliance by measuring the availability
and quality of specific items, such as the provision of equipment
and supplies, travel and per diem allowances, and the provision
of housing and dining facilities. S8 Equal aggregate expenditures
for each sex or for sex-segregated teams are not required, but
HEW may compare the funds provided for each sex in each catexpeditiously as possible but in no event later than three years
from the effective date of this regulation.
75. ld. § 86.41(a).
76. ld. § 86.41(b).
77. ld. "The contact sports exception is difficult to justify, either on the basis of
physical differences between the sexes or as a matter of statutory interpretation." Cox,
supra note 4, at 44. See note 154 infra.
78. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1980).
79.ld.
.
80.ld.
81. ld.
82. ld. See note 74 supra, for text of this subsection.
83.ld.
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egory to determine whether the institution is providing equality
of opportunity for both sexes.54 The remaining sections of the
final regulations set forth the adjustment period85 and the requirements for athletic scholarships.86
The final regulations, although retaining the important
equal opportunity provision, differ from the proposed regulations in several important respects. By deleting the affirmative
efforts section, HEW has substantially reduced an institution's
responsibility for effective and immediate compliance with the
mandates of Title IX. The proposed regulations required dissemination of information concerning the availability of athletic
opportunities. Additionally, they required training activities
designed to expand and improve athletic capabilities. These sections were eliminated from the final version. By adding the contact sports exception, HEW provided yet another loophole
through which institutions may avoid compliance with the purpose of Title IX. As a result, the final regulations retreat from
the coverage of the proposed procedures.87
ID. THE POLICY INTERPRETATION
To clarify the meaning of the final regulations and to provide athletic programs with detailed guidelines for compliance
with Title IX, HEW issued a proposed and then a final set of
policy guidelines. The proposed policy interpretation was issued
December 11, 1978.88 During the public comment period that
84.ld.
85. ld. § 86.41(d).
86. ld. § 86.37(c). This subsection provides:
Athletic scholarships. (1) To the extent that a recipient
awards athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid, it must provide
reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each
sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for
members of each sex may be provided as part of separate athletic teams for members of each sex to the extent consistent
with this paragraph and § 86.41.
87. "The final HEW regulation apparently retreated from the proposed regulation
by adding the contact sports exception, deleting the language requiring 'affirmative efforts' to increase opportunities for women, and dropping the annual 'determination of
student interest' requirement." Cox, supra note 4, at 63.
88. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070-76 (1978).
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followed, HEW received more than 700 responses.89 HEW staff
members visited eight universities during June and July of 1979
to observe how the proposed policy would apply in actual practice.90 Based on these observations, and the nearly 100 complaints alleging discrimination in athletics against more than 50
institutions, HEW decided that it should provide further guidance, primarily concerning the application of Title IX to intercollegiate athletic programs.91 The result was the final·policy interpretation, issued December 4, 1979.92 The final policy
interpretation merits extensive discussion both because it
presents the fullest statement of how HEW will determine statutory compliance, and because the courts must consider the
guidelines when deciding cases of alleged sex discrimination in
athletics. 93 The policy interpretation does not have the full force
and effect of law,94 but a reviewing court is required to give
"great deference" to an agency's interpretation of the statute.SG
Because the guidelines set forth in the final policy are based on
approved regulations and therefore have a reasonable basis in
law, they carry substantial weight in determinations of institutional compliance with Title IX.s6
The guidelines underwent substantial changes between issuance of the proposed and final policies. The changes cannot be
89. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
9O.ld.
9!. ld. The proposed policy interpretation was designed specifically for intercollegiate athletics. The general guidelines, however, can apply to club, intramural, and interscholastic athletic programs, all of which are covered by the regulations. ld.
92. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). The final policy interpretation became effective December 11, 1979.
93. See note 95 infra.
94. Because HEW has complied with publication rules similar to the regulations and
steps have been taken to submit the final policy to Congress for review, however, HEW
may claim that the guidelines have the full force and effect of law. Gaal & DiLorenzo,
supra note 24, at 163 n.12.
95. See Fredericks v. Kreps, 578 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1978) (if interpretation given a
statute by agency charged with its administration is reasonable, a court must sustain the
agency's actions even though the court might consider an alternative approach more reasonable); Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585 (D.D.C. 1979) (in seeking to construe
meaning of statutory provision, great, even decisive, weight should be accorded to the
continuous practical construction accorded the provision by those with the responsibility
to administer it); Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 784 (D. Alaska 1978)
(great deference should be accorded to agency's interpretation of its own guidelines even
though guidelines are not regulations).
96. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (when construction of administrative
regulation rather than statute is in issue, deference is even greater).
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fully appreciated without a brief examination of the proposed
policy.

A.

THE PROPOSED POLICY

The proposed policy was based on two factors HEW considered important in establishing criteria for determining compliance with the statute.97 First, most colleges and universities have
traditionally emphasized sports for men.9S This emphasis has
contributed to differences "in the number of sports and scope of
competition offered to men and women. U99 Consequently, disproportionately more aid has been made available for male athletes than for female athletes.10o Second, despite the discrepancies in coaching, equipment, access to facilities, publicity, and
housing, women's participation in intercollegiate athletics increased 100 percent during the period from 1971 to 1976.101
Taking these factors into account, the department divided
the proposed policy into two sections. The first, entitled "Eliminating Discrimination in Existing Programs,"102 set forth a twopart approach to determine whether a college or university had
eliminated discrimination on the basis of sex in its existing programs. 103 Part A of this section listed factors HEW considered
important in determining whether an institution provided equal
athletic opportunity.1M Thus, for example, under this section an
97. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978).
98. [d. Of the 395,000 students participating in intercollegiate sports in the academic year 1976-1977, 74% were men and 26% were women. HEW based these figures
on data from the AIAW, which was based on participation data from the NCAA, the
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), and the National Junior College Athletic Association (NJCAA). [d. at 58,071 n.6.
99. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978). "On the average, colleges and universities provide
approximately ten sports for men and only six for women." [d. This finding is based on
limited data from the NCAA. [d. at 58,071 n.7.
100. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978). As of 1978, the average annual scholarship budget
was $39,000. Male athletes received 82% of this amount while female athletes received
only 17.9% of the total, despite the fact that women constituted 26% of the participating athletes. These figures were obtained from the AIAW, STRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION
SURVEY DATA SUMMARY (1978). 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 n.8 (1978).
101. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,071 (1978).
102. [d. at 58,072 (1978).
103. [d.
104. Part A provides:
Equality of benefits and opportunities in many aspects of a
recipient's intercollegiate athletic program can best be measured in financial terms. Financially measurable benefits and
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institution would be found in compliance with this provision if it
offered substantially equal average per capita funds to participating male and female athletes for scholarships, recruitment,
and other financially measurable benefits. lo5 Part B focused on
opportunities not financially measurable and provided a more
expansive interpretation of the equal opportunity provisions of
the regulations. lOS
The second section of the proposed policy required affirmative efforts by colleges and universities to effectively accomodate
the athletic interests and abilities of both sexes.107 A recipient
institution would be required to demonstrate that it included
procedures designed to encourage women to participate, to increase the number of women's sports, to publicize the athletic
opportunities for women, and to elevate the scope of women's
intercollegiate competition. los An institution choosing not to follow these procedures could nevertheless satisfy the equal opportunity provision by demonstrating that the sports currently offered to women were comparable to those offered to men. 109 In
addition, a university would be in compliance if it could show a
pattern of increased participation by women and if it could
demonstrate that the institution's athletic program reflected the
athletic interests of women. 110
These procedures, similar to the affirmative efforts section
found in the proposed regulations, III were deleted by HEW in
opportunities covered by the Title IX regulation [45 CFR
86.41(c)] include but are not limited to:
1. Financial assistance awarded on the basis of athletic
ability;
2. Recruitment of athletes;
3. Provision and maintenance of equipment and supplies;
4. Living and travel expenses related to competitive
events; and
5. Publicity.
ld.
105. ld. at 58,073. See note 119 infra, for an example of a per capita formula based
on the criteria set forth in the final policy.
106. ld at 58,071. See note 74 supra, for text of the equal opportunity provision of
the final regulation.
107. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,074 (1978).
108.ld.
109.ld.
110.ld.
111. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
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the final policy interpretation. A clear trend exists for the proposed rules to embrace the more revolutionary goals U2 which are
then deleted from the final versions. This may be attributed in
part to the efforts of special interest groups such as the NCAA,
which exerted pressure on HEW through a well-organized national campaign geared to oppose HEW's interpretation of the
statute. U3 These efforts effectively diluted the guidelines, allowing a university to comply with the retained provisions while
only minimally encouraging participation by female athletes.

B.

THE FINAL POLICY INTERPRETATION

The final policy interpretation is divided into three sections,
which will be examined in the order in which they appear. To
judge whether the interpretation is compatible with the goals of
Title IX, one must determine whether the policy is consistent
with the statute and with the implementing regulations. HEW
has expanded the jurisdictional scope of Title IX by stating that
the final policy will apply to "any public or private institution,
person or other entity that operates an educational program or
activity which receives or benefits from financial assistance authorized or extended under a law administered by the depart112. Both the proposed regulations and the proposed policy interpretation contained sections which specifically required that affirmative efforts be made to encourage
and upgrade the level of participation by women in intercollegiate sports. These procedures were revolutionary because they would have forced institutions not only to equalize opportunity for women, but to take steps in assuring that this opportunity be provided. See Cox, supra note 4, at 52.
113. Women's Sports Face New Hurdles, On Campus With Women, Spring 1979, at
1 [hereinafter cited as On Campus With Women].(Copies of the newsletter may be
obtained from the Project on the Status and Education of Women, Ass'n of American
Colleges, 1818 R Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20009.) The article offers a detailed
account of the NCAA's lobbying efforts:
.
The National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education, which generally views the proposed policy as a positive
step toward the implementation of Title IX, charges that the
anti-Title IX mail currently flooding the Congress and HEW
is not representative of the majority of institutions and individuals affected by the law, but the result of a well-financed
lobbying effort by the NCAA and a few schools that have not
taken steps to eliminate sex discrimination in their athletic
programs. The Coalition also claims the national education
associations are not representing the interests of those on
campus in this matter, and that women lack the financial resources and political sophistication needed to make their
voices heard in Washington.
[d. at 1.
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ment."1l4 Other changes in the final policy will be revealed by
examining each of the three sections separately.

Athletic Financial Assistance (Scholarships)
Section A, entitled "Athletic Financial Assistance,"llll assesses compliance with the scholarship provisions of the regulation.1l6 Under this section, HEW will conduct a "financial comparison to determine whether proportionately equal amounts of
financial assistance are available to men's and women's athletic
programs."ll'1 According to former Secretary Patricia Roberts
Harris, this means that "if 70 percent of a school's athletes are
male, they are entitled to 70 percent of the financial aid dollars
their school makes available."lls HEW will evaluate an institution's award of financial assistance by determining the amount
of aid available to men and then dividing that amount by the
number of men who participate in the athletic program.1l9 It will
114. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,414 (1978).
The new interpretation's statement attempts to expand considerably HEW's jurisdiction by shifting the focus from "programs" in receipt of federal aid to "institutions" in receipt of
federal aid. Under this more recent pronouncement, coverage
of an athletic program will be asserted if the institution itself
merely receives or benefits from federal financial assistance regardless of any specific benefit to the athletic program.
Gaal, DiLorenzo & Evans, HEW's Final 'Policy Interpretation" of Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 6 J. COLL. & U.L. 345, 352 (1980).
115. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979).
116. Id. See note 86 supra.
117. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979).
118. Press Conference of Patricia Roberts Harris, former Secretary of HEW (Dec. 4,
1979).
119. This interpretation of the scholarship provision and the following hypothetical
are based on a telephone interview with Lionel S. Sobel, Esq. (Oct. 21, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Sobel Interview]. For example, if the aggregate amount available is $300,000 and
there are 300 male athletes, the amount per participant would be $1,000. Correspondingly, if the aggregate amount available for female athletes is $100,000 and there are 100
participants, the amount per athlete would come to $1,000. Based on this hypothetical,
the institution would be in compliance. A possible violation may occur where only
$80,000 is made available to the women's program but there are 100 participants, in
which case the amount per athlete would be only $800. If this discrepancy is based on
non-discriminatory factors, however, the institution may still be in compliance despite
the unequal allocation. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979). See notes 122-125 infra for examples of nondiscriminatory factors.
HEW defines "participants" as those athletes:
a. Who are receiving the institutionally-sponsored support
normally provided to athletes competing at the institution involved, e.g., coaching, equipment, medical and training room
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also determine the amount of aid made available to women and
will divide that amount by the number of female athletes. 12o Ideally, the resulting per capita amount of aid available to men
should be the same as the per capita amount available to women. 121 HEW will allow universities to justify some funding disparities by showing that nondiscriminatory factors caused the
resulting differences. 122 These factors may include tuition for
out-of-state students or a decision to spread the scholarship
money over a full generation of athletes. 123 For example, if 95
football players-75 of whom come from out-of-state-receive
scholarships, HEW may allow an imbalance in the resulting
averages because tuition for these players is higher. 12' An athletic director may also arbitrarily decide that the available scholarship money should be distributed over a four-year period for
purposes of team development. Although twelve basketball
scholarships may be available for women, the athletic director
may choose to allocate three full scholarships per year for four
years.1215 HEW will allow this kind of per capita distribution despite the resulting disparity in the average amount of scholarship aid provided for men and women. Because Section A does
not require that a proportionate number of scholarships be of
equal> dollar value, the manner in which expenditures can be
made for men and women continue to differ substantially. us
services, on a regular basis during a sport's season; and
b. Who are participating in organized practice sessions
and other team meetings and activities on a regular basis during a sport's season; and
c. Who are listed on the eligibility or squad lists maintained for each sport; or
d. Who, because of injury, canIlot meet fl, b or c above but
continue to receive financial aid on the basis of athletic ability.
44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979).
120. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979).
121. ld.
122. ld. See note 119 supra.
123.ld.
124. Sobel Interview, supra note 119.
125.ld.
126. As a result of NCAA rules applicable to scholarships, for example, male athletes who participate in football and basketball are routinely offered full scholarships
despite the fact that they are not required to show a financial need for the money:
NCAA regulations permit a maximum of 95 "full ride" grantsin-aid (tuition, room and board) for football athletes and 15
"full ride" grants-in-aid for basketball athletes. Almost all
athletes in these two sports, in other words, are permitted to
be on full scholarship. Recent efforts by Division I institutions
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The men's program may award full scholarships to some of its
athletes while the women's program may offer partial scholarships to a larger number of athletes. 127 Although women would
receive smaller awards than those men who receive awards, this
would not violate the policy's standard.
Despite the need for incentives to upgrade the levels of
competition available to women's teams, an institution might ar. tificially restrict the development of these teams to keep costs
down. 128 Because there is no time limit on deferral of scholarship
funds, nor any requirement that the funds actually be carried
forward and made available for the particular sex which does
not receive the aid in a given year, a director could technically
discourage the development of the women's team. 129 While ostensibly providing for an equitable distribution of available
scholarship money based on participation, the inclusion of the
nondiscriminatory factors weakens the force of Section A. Women denied adequate scholarships as a result of a programmatic
decision have little recourse despite the unequal per capita allocation. Although HEW's method of determining compliance provides flexibility in measuring the distribution of scholarship assistance, it does not guarantee this assistance will be shared
equitably. Thus the use of nondiscriminatory factors may serve
to slow the pace of compliance with Title IX.
to limit grants-in-aid to athletes with proven financial need
have not been successful.
. . . Although AIAW regulations also permit "full ride"
grants-in-aid for female athletes •.• AlAW data show that
women receive considerably less money for grants-in-aid than
men.
MORE HURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 30 (footnotes omitted). For example, at Syracuse University, 83% of the available scholarship money goes to the 75% male athletic
population while only 17% goes to the women who comprise 25% of the participating
athletes. deCrow, Hardlining Title IX: Who's Off-Side Now?, PERsPECTIVES, Summer
1980, at 18-19.
127. See Update on Title IX and Sports #2, On Campus With Women, supra note
113.
128. Id. Because the distribution of available scholarship money is left to the discretion of the athletic director, the manner in which expenditures are made may determine
the growth of the team. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
129. Update on Title IX and Sports #2, On Campus With Women, supra note 113.
"Thus a director could technically decide to defer some or even all women's' awards in a
particular year, claiming that 'next year' would be a better time to encourage a particular
women's sport." Id. at 4.
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Equivalence of Benefits and Opportunities
Section B, entitled "Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits
and Opportunities,"ISO provides a more expansive list of criteria
for determining whether an athletic program is nondiscriminatory. Using the equal opportunity provision of the regulation as
its basis, lSI the Department will compare the "availability, quality, and kinds of benefits, opportunities and treatment afforded
members of both sexes"IS2 to assess compliance. HEW lists nine
nonfinancial factors to be used in evaluating whether men and
women are receiving equal benefits:
(1) Provision and maintenance of equipment and supplies;
(2) Scheduling of games and practice times;

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Travel and per diem expenses; _
Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
Provision of medical and training facilities;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
(8) Provision of housing and dining facilities; and
(9) Publicity. ISS
HEW bases its compliance determination on whether each
of these program components are equivalent, that is, equal or
equal in effect.1S' Additionally, HEW will examine the recruitment practices of the athletic programs for both sexes to determine whether the goal of equal opportunity will require modification of those practices.1SG Identical recruiting methods are not
required although nondiscriminatory criteria must be used in
structuring recruitment programs. ISS The proposed policy listed
recruitment under the financially measurable benefits section,lS7
subject to the per capita formulation. By removing it from that
section, recruitment is no longer assessed by a financial compari130. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979).
131. See note 74 supra, for text of equal opportunity provision of the final
reiuIations.
132. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979).
133. ld. at 71,415-17.
134. ld. at 71,415.
135. ld. at 71,417.
136.ld..
137. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,072 (1978).
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son to determine whether benefits are distributed in a proportionate fashion. The standard now used to measure compliance
is, more generally, equality of opportunity.13s One author argues
that this measurement, as applied to recruitment, will not prevent discrimination. 139 In fact, "[t]he shift is away from a comparison by sexes to, essentially, an inter-institutional comparison
within each sex group which could permit, not forestall, discrimination. "140 As a result, recruitment practices which require
more money to attract the best male athletesl4l may go
unchecked.
HEW defends its Section B criteria by claiming that identical opportunities are not required and that disparities may be
justified by nondiscriminatory factors. In The "unique aspect of
a particular sport" or "activities which are directly associated
with a competitive event in a single sex sport"I43 are examples
of such factors. Features which are considered "directly associated with a competitive event" include "rules of play, nature/
replacement of equipment, rates of injury resulting from participation, nature of facilities required for competition, and the
maintenance/upkeep requirements of those facilities."144 This
provision was promulgated to exempt institutions from having
to provide equal athletic opportunities in sports traditionally
played by men. Football, for example, is unique for its high per
capita cost.1415 This feature virtually exempts football from con138. 44 Fed Reg. at 71,415.
139. See GaaI, DiLorenzo & Evans, supra note 114, at 357.
140.Id.
141. See, e.g., Axhelm, The Shame of College Sports, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 22, 1980, at
54.
142. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-16 (1979).
143.Id.
144.Id.
145. See Spink, Popular, But Expensive, 16 NCAA NEWS, No. 17, at 2 (1980).
From head to toe, it costs between $250 and $400 to outfit a
college football player. The bill goes something like this: Helmet, $70; shoulder pads, $40; shoes, $40; jersey, $20; pants,
$40; girdle pads, $15; thigh pads, $15; knee pads, $5; mouthpiece, $2; socks, $2; sanitary shorts, $3; and supporter, $1. Add
optional elbow, forearm and hand pads, $20, and shoulder pad
extensions, $12, and the total of $260. That isn't all. You need
a couple of jerseys and pants of different colors since the
teams play home and away games, plus foul-weather capes
and practice uniforms, and you're up to around $400 a player.
Id. "The average college with Division I football spends $1,045,000 on that sport, or 47
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sideration when determining whether equality of opportunity is
present. Because single sex sports such as football and basketball are conducted on a national level, per capita expenses are
greater than expenses for sports conducted at a regional or local
level. A women's team in the initial stages of development, and
therefore confined to the local level, would not receive the same
degree of institutional support that the more popular, maledominated sports receive. HEW justifies this imbalance by noting the unique demands of these athletic events: "Since the costs
of managing an athletic event increase with crowd size, the overall support made available for event management to men's and
women's programs may differ in degree and kind."l46 When
men's athletic events are assumed to be more commercially viable, aner therefore more deserving of funds, efforts to increase
the spectator appeal of women's athletic events will go unsupported. Because HEW considers the "particular sport" exception
in determining whether institutions provide equal athletic opportunities, Title IX's broad prohibition against discrimination
is not assured. .

Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and Abilities
Section C of the policy interpretation provides guidelines
for determining compliance with the provision of the regulation
that requires an athletic director to consider "whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate
the interests and abilities of members of both sexes. "14'1 HEW
assesses compliance by examining the interests and abilities of
athletes, the selection of sports offered, the levels of competition
available, and the opportunity for team competition.148 If an institution sponsors a team for men in a specific sport, it may be
required to permit women to try out for that team or to sponsor
a separate team. 149 With regard to contact SpOrts,IISO if an institution sponsors a team for members of one sex, it must also propercent of its men's athletic budget. The average Division I football squad is composed
of 106 athletes; these colleges therefore spend an average of $9,858 on each football athlete." MORE HURDLES To CLEAR supra note 3, at 29 (footnotes omitted).
146. 44 Fed: Reg. 71,416 (1979).
147. ld. at 71,417.
148.ld.
149. ld. at 71,418.
150. See text accompanying note 78 supra, for those sports which HEW considers
contact sports.
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vide a team for members of the other sex. This will be required
only if sufficient interest and ability· to sustain a viable team
with a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition is
shown. llli If opportunities for one sex have been historically limited, a separate team may be required. 11l2 In non-contact sports,
HEW additionally requires an institution to sponsor a separate
team if members of the excluded sex lack sufficient skill to be
selected for a single integrated team. IllS
The contact sports exception is the subject of continuing
debate. 1M Assuming that the women's team in any given sport
does not have a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition,lllll the exceptional sportswoman may desire a place on the
men's team so that she may develop her full athletic potential.
Unfortunately, the final policy does not set forth specific guidelines which might guarantee her participation should she qualify. If she is denied an opportunity to compete, the prospect of
equal opportunity will be limited. Even if the institution sponsors a separate women's team, her skill level may never be
matched by other team players. Additionally, when only a minority of women are interested in contact sports, under Section
C, these women will be denied an opportunity to compete.
The contact sports exception is not justified on the basis of
statistics concerning risk of injury to women.lIIS Research on the
151. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Cox, supra note 4, at 44-45 (contact sports exception does not further statutory purpose); Hitchens, A Litigation Strategy on Behalf of the Outstanding High
School Female Athlete, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 423 (1979) (the exceptional female
athlete denied an opportunity to compete on male teams in contact and non contact
sports may not develop full athletic potential); Note, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Issues Reach the Courts, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 310, 323 (1979) ("Disapproval of the contact sport regulation is not surprising, for its total denial of opportunity
to participate in an education activity on the basis of sex is clearly inconsistent with
Title IX's equal opportunity purpose.").
155. For example, although there may be substantial interest and ability to sustain
a women's football team in one institution, this level of interest may not be matched by
women players at other institutions thus decreasing the opportunity for intercollegiate
competition.
156. Cox, supra note 4, at 44, notes that:
Opposition to mixed competition in contact sports is
based on an underlying belief that women will have a higher
rate of injuries than men if men and women compete against
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physical and athletic differences between men and women indicates that in some ways the female's endurance level may be
equal to or greater than the male's.11I7 Records demonstrate that
differences in performance potential between men and women in .
athletic events· are diminishing,11I8 and sports physiologists have
shown that women can compete as actively as men in all
sports.11I9 Despite this data, however, the cultural taboo against
each other. To justify the contact sports exception in intercollegiate athletics because of the increased injury risk to women,
one must conclude that women are more susceptible to injuries than men at the same levels of ability, a conclusion that is
far from obvious. Statistics concerning the relative size,
weight, and likelihood of injury of average women and men are
irrelevant, for example, to the possible exclusion of all women
from an intercollegiate football team, because neither average
women nor average men could normally compete on such
teams.
(Footnotes omitted.)
157. "As more and more women enter long distance events, 8uch as the marathons
and multievent supermarathons, evidence is growing that their endurance may be equal
or perhaps even superior to men's in some ways, and their systems may be more efficient
in turning stored fats into energy." Wood, The Emerging Woman Athlete, Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, May 25, 1980, at 5, col. 1. Another author finds that women are
better 8uited for long distance events:
In general, a woman needs less food than a man of equal
weight; she has more accessible calories to burn in the same
activity because of the thicker layer of fat under her skin. This
fat gives her a larger reserve energy supply for endurance contests, so she is less dependent on carbohydrate loading-filling
up on 8tarch to build up stores of glycogen fuel in the muscles.
The insulating fat also makes a woman's slightly lower body
temperature more stable than a man's. She relies less on
sweating to dissipate heat; therefore she retains fluid and salts
better and doesn't need to drink as much during exertion. As a
result of this difference, a woman tends to perform better in
cold but has less tolerance of heat than a man of equal size.
Cimons, How Women Got To Run The Distance, MS., July 1981, at 47.
158. Wood, supra note 157, at 5.
159.
Sports physiologists have demonstrated that women can play
as actively as men, that Olympic athletes have competed and
won at all stages of the menstrual cycle, and that exercise, if
anything, is beneficial rather than harmful in alleviating menstrual complaints. The effect of training and competition on
the ease of childbirth is pronounced. A study of Olympic athletes showed that they delivered their babies 87.2 percent
faster than established norms, with 50 percent fewer Caesarian sections than in normal populations. Another study found
that women with chronic fatigue and low back pain following
pregnancy suffered primarily from the lack of physical activity
dating from poorly developed anterior abdominal musculature.
MORE HURDLES To CLEAR, supra note 3, at 5 (footnotes omitted). The stereotype regard-
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women participating in contact sports remains. 1SO Women have
been conditioned throughout their lives to avoid displays of
strength which, in turn, has inhibited their desire to perform in
athletic competitions. 1s1 Thus, sport, according to the stereoing women's physical fragility while menstruating or while pregnant is based upon myths
which reinforce female passivity.
160. Due to the stereotypic view of female behavior, the sportswoman who participates in contact sports with men or in sports which require overt aggressive behavior
may suffer anxiety over the conflict between her desire to compete and her desire to
conform to the accepted role model which society has given her.
It would seem that this anxiety is the expression of the inner
conflict between desires to fulfill the expectations outlined by
society. Homer has identified the female's conflict between
her competitive desires and her desire to fit into society as a
double bind. Performance in sport especially intensifies this
conflict because athletics is one area that has been historically
appropriate for males only. Thus, for the female athlete, it is
not only that she has exhibited qualities that do not conform
to society's 'appropriate sex-role' but that she has actively
pursued this nonappropriate behavior in what was an exclusively male territory.
Del Rey, The Apologetic and Women in Sport, in WOMEN AND SPORT, supra note 1, at
108 (footnote omitted). As one author notes, "To be female and an athlete have been
contradictory role expectations." Mathes, Body Image and Sex Stereotyping, WOMEN
AND SPORT, supra note 1, at 66. The existing stereotypic differences tend to reinforce the
idea that women are passive, emotional, and expressive while men are active, aggressive,
and effective. In contemporary American culture, this is a deeply received way of thinking about the sexes. The differences are not only approved of, but are often idealized.
The ideal woman is perceived as significantly less aggressive,
less independent, less dominant, less active, more emotional,
having greater difficulty in making decisions, etc., than the
ideal man; the ideal man is perceived as significantly less religious, less neat, less gentle, less aware of the feelings of others,
less expressive, etc., than the ideal woman. Both greater competence in men than in women, and greater warmth and expressiveness in women than in men, then, are apparently desirable in our contemporary society.
Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal, in WOMEN AND ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 2, at 39. Thus, there are social
pressures which the female athlete must resist and overcome before her participation in
contact sports will be regarded as healthy, not only by other athletes, but, it is hoped, by
society at large.
161.
No doubt exists that men are stronger than women, but the
actual strength of women, particularly in this country, has
been underestimated. The potent social stigma that is attached to the attainment of strength by females is a powerful
influence that certainly must affect the amount of force produced by females on strength tests .... A compounding factor
is that many strength tests are administered to females in
groups, or worse, in the presence of males. Finally, almost all
experimentors who have measured the strength of females are
Women's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss3/2

34

Johnson: Title IX

1981]

TITLE IX

793

type, is "not so serious nor central to women. "162 As more media
attention focuses on women's achievement in sport, this societal
barrier, often internalized by women, may diminish. Demystification of sport must begin in the schools where young girls receive their first exposure to team competition. If higher educational institutions continue to exclude the female athelete from
contact sports because of cultural and economic pressures, not
only will her athletic potential be limited; her opportunity for a
future career in professional sports will be stifled.

IV. REMEDIES

A.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Despite the weaknesses inherent in the final policy interpretation, sportswomen who suffer discrimination should vigorously
pursue their rights using both the administrative procedures
available under Title IX and their private right of action. The
first step is to notify the institution that the alleged discrimination violates Title IX.163 For example, if the women's crew team
males. Adolescent females are loathe to display strength under
any circumstances, but particularly in the presence of a male.
In summary, women are certainly not as strong as men, but
they may not be as weak as they have been credited to be.
More specifically, the age of 12lh as the age of maximum
strength may be an artifact of the adolescent society.
F. GERBER, J. FELSHIN, P. BERLIN & W. WYRICK, supra note 1, at 429. One author notes
that there is "common agreement that the upper body of the female has about 50 to 60
percent the strength of the male and the lower body has 70 to 80 percent the strength of
the male. When a correction is made for si2e, the female has about 80 percent of the
strength of a male." Hudson, Physical Parameters Used for Female Exclusion from Law
Enforcement and Athletics, in WOMEN AND SPORT, supra note 1, at 35. Cultural expectations tend to diminish the chance that an average girl has of developing upper body
strength as early as the fifth year. Girls and women are conditioned not to show strength.
Evidence shows that through puberty muscles grow first in si2e and later in strength.
Because strength depends on appropriate physical exercise, and the adolescent environment is not conducive to athletic training for girls, this period is perhaps the most important reason behind the lack of strength in most women. As a result, differences between men and women appear to be more a function of activity level than gender. ld. at
40-41. To make a fair comparison of performance potential between the sexes, events
with equivalence in training, motivation, equipment, and structural composition should
be exanlined. ld. at 49.
162. F. GERBER, J. FELSHIN, P. BERLIN, & W. WYRICK, supra note 1, at 206. The
authors maintain that societal assumptions regarding female athletes create the very
conditions which denigrate sport as an activity for women. ld.
163. Telephone interview with Sheryl Sklorman, Project Assistant at SPRINT, a
project of the Women's Equity Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5, 1981).
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has access to the boats at five a.m., while the men's.team always
uses the boats in the afternoon, the athletic department and the
administration should be informed of the unequal accommodation. 164 If an institution covered by Title Ix does not voluntarily
act to correct the discrimination, the athlete may then file a letter of complaint with the Department of Education (Department).165 The complaint must be filed within 180 days after the
discrimination occurs unless the illegal activity is ongoing.166 If
the athletic program has a history of discrimination still in operation, the athlete may file her complaint at any time. The complaint should include a detailed description of the alleged violations. 167 The Department must investigate the complaint within
ninety days of receipt. 16B If the Department finds the institution
164. Systematic procedures on how an athlete might organize an effort to make a
particular institution aware of discrimination may be obtained by writing to SPRINT,
Project of the Women's Equity Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund, 805
15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.
165. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1974). See NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND,
PROJECT ON EQUAL EDUCATION RIGHTS, ANYONE'S GUIDE TO FILING ATITLE IX COMPLAINT,
(1980) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE]. Reprints are available through PEER, 112 13th St.,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. Administrative remedies under Title IX are identical to
those of Title VI. See note 13 supra and accompanying text, for a discussion of similarities between the statutes.
166. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1980).
167. See GUIDE, supra note 165, at 1. The letter should also include the name and
address of the university, a general description of the person(s) suffering from discrimination, and the approximate date(s) of discrimination. [d.
168. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979). This section provides:
The process of Title IX enforcement is set forth in Section 86.71 of the Title IX regulation, which incorporates by
reference the enforcement procedures applicable to Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The enforcement process prescribed by the regulation is supplemented by an order of the
Federal District Court, District of Columbia, which establishes
time frames for each of the enforcement steps.
According to the regulation, there are two ways in which
enforcement is initiated:
Compliance Reviews-Periodically the Department must
select a number of recipients (in this case, colleges and universities which operate intercollegiate athletic programs) and
conduct investigations to determine whether recipients are
complying with Title IX. (45 CFR 80.7(a».
Complaints-The Department must investigate all valid
(written and timely) complaints alleging discrimination on the
basis of sex in a recipient's programs. (45 CFR 80.7(b».
The Department must inform the recipient (and the complainant, if applicable) of the results of its investigation. If the
investigation indicates that a recipient is in compliance, the
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in violation and the school does not voluntarily comply, the Department will begin a formal process leading to termination of
federal assistance. 1G9
Although these procedures are outlined in detail in the final
policy interpretation, and the Office for Civil Rights is under
court order to enforce them,170 implementation has been ineffective. 171 Due to lack of resources and the delay between initial
Department states this, and the case is closed. If the investigation indicates noncompliance, the Department outlines the violations found.
The Department has 90 days to conduct an investigation
and inform the recipient of its findings, and an additional 90
days to resolve violations by obtaining a voluntary compliance
agreement from the recipient. This is done through negotiations between the Department and the recipient, the goal of
which is agreement on steps the recipient will take to achieve
compliance. Sometimes the violation is relatively minor and
can be corrected immediately. At other times, however, the
negotiations result in a plan that will correct the violations
within a specified period of time. To be acceptable, a plan'
must describe the manner in which institutional resources will
be used to correct the violation. It also must state acceptable
time tables for reaching interim goals and full compliance.
When agreement is reached, the Department notifies the institution that its plan is acceptable. The Department then is obligated to review periodically the implementation of the plan.
An institution that is in violation of Title IX may already
be implementing a corrective plan. In this case, prior to informing the recipient about the results of its investigation, the
Department will determine whether the plan is adequate.
169. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,419 (1979). See note 32 supra, for text of fund termination
provision.
170. OCR is responsible for enforcing Title IX. In a consolidation of three cases, the
District Court for the District of Columbia ordered OCR to conduct investigations of
colleges and universities under two separate timetables set forth in the consent decree.
Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. 1977).
171.
Continual criticism has been leveled at HEW's enforcement
effort. In 1974 the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL),
joined by other organizations and individuals, filed suit
against HEW for failure to enforce Executive orders and statutes, including Title IX, that prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sex in educational institutions and programs receiving
Federal funds. In 1975 this Commission criticized HEW for its
long delay in publishing final Title IX regulations, observing
that the Department's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) had
thereby "effectively nullified the intent of the Congress." A
1976 study by the Project on Equal Education Rights (PEER)
concluded that HEW's enforcement efforts to that date had
been "negligible", and another study completed that year
found that HEW had failed to set "clear and consistent poli-
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complaints and investigations, administrative proce4ures may be
of limited use. An athlete may wait years before investigations
are completed and compliance finally achieved. 1'12 The administrative procedure is important, however, because the alternative-filing a lawsuit-may be financially infeasible for many
student athletes.

B.

PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION: RECENT CASES

Under Cannon v. University of Chicago,1'18 a private right of
cies and enforce them to implement Title IX." In 1977 the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in approving
a settlement of the WEAL suit and two other cases involving
HEW's civil rights enforcement practices, issued an order setting time frames for processing complaints and eliminating the
complaint backlog and specifying the number of sex discrimination complaints to be processed and Title IX compliance reviews to be conducted the following year. Commonly known as
the Adams order after another case it settled, the order noted
in the preamble that if OCR staff were not further increased,
compliance would require substantially increased efficiency•
. . . [I)n November 1979 OCR acknowledged that it had
not complied fully with the Title IX requirements of the Adams order, having failed to resolve policy in three critical areas
or devote sufficient staff resources to compliance reviews.
ENFORCING TrrLE IX, supra note 11, at 3-5 (footnotes omitted). "In its submission to
[the Supreme) Court, as well as in other public statements, HEW has candidly admitted
that it does not have the resources necessary to enforce Title IX in a substantial number
of circumstances ...•" Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 n.42 (1979).
See also Note, The Enforcement Provisions for Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 Can Be Strengthened to Make the Title IX Regulations More Effective, 49
TEMP. L.Q. 207, 221 (1975).

172. Universities Charged With Sex Discrimination in Athletics Under Title IX,
SPRINT, IN THE RUNNING, No.3, 1980, at 2 (complaints filed in 1973 still pending).
173. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Geraldine Cannon applied for admission in 1974 to medical school at the University of Chicago and Northwestern University. She was denied
admission allegedly due to her age; both schools had express policies against admitting
individuals over thirty without advanced degrees. Ms. Cannon was 39 years old at the
time of her application. After seeking reconsideration from admission officials, she submitted a complaInt to the Chicago Office of HEW alleging the medical schools had violated Title IX by denying her admission on the basis of sex. Both schools were recipients
of federal funds. Mter receiving only an acknowledgment of her complaint from HEW,
Ms. Cannon filed suit in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois. The court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief. Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd on rehearing, 559 F.2d
1077 (7th Cir. 1977). The issue on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was whether petitioner had a private right of action under Title IX. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that such a right was implied in the legislative history of the statute. 441 U.S. at 677-78.
See Wallace, How to Cure Your Sex Discrimination Ills: Take One Title IX Private
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action will be implied under Title IX..1'14 Administrative remedies need not be exhausted before filing suit in federal COurt.l'11S
The court in Cannon based its conclusion, in part, on the fact
that Title IX. was specifically modeled after Title VI, which had
been interpreted to provide a private remedy for the victim of
discrimination. l '16 Additionally, the court recognized the inadequacy of the administrative enforcement of the statutel '1'1 when
it stated that "an implied private right of action is necessary to
insure the fundamental purpose of Title IX. • • • • "1'18
The most recent cases following the Cannon decision have
been brought as class actions on behalf of members of university
athletic teams alleging violations of Title IX..1'19 In Rollin Ha/fer
v. Temple University/SO a .suit currently pending, eight female
athletes charged the university with discrimination in areas such
as scholarships, facilities, equipment, financial support, and recruitment.1Sl A financial breakdown of fund allocation is set
forth in the complaint as evidence of noncompliance.182 Plaintiffs allege that male athletes at Temple University received
more than $700,000 in scholarships during the 1979-1980 academic year, compared with $188,000 in scholarships for women. 1SS The University's Faculty Senate report indicated that,
Action and Cannon v. University of Chicago, Then Sue Them in the Morning, 1980
UTAH L. REV. 629; Comment, Private Right of Action Under Title IX: Cannon v. University of Chicago, 57 DENVER L.J. 437 (1980); Comment, Private Rights of Action Under
Title IX, 13 MARv. C.R.L. REv. 425 (1978); Comment, Private Rights of Action Under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Cannon v. University of Chicago, 3
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 141 (1980); Comment, Implication of a Private Right of Action
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Nw. U.L. REv. 772 (1978).
174. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
175. Ido at 707 n.41.
176. Id. at 696.
177. Ido at 708.
178. Ido at 708 n.42.
179. Rollin Haffer v. Temple Univ., No. 80-1362 (EoD. Pa., filed April 8, 1980); Bennett v. West Texas State Univ., No. 2-80-73, (N.D. Tex., filed May 22, 1980); Pavey v.
University of Alaska, 490 F. Supp. 1011 (D. Alaska 1980). The complaint in Pavey
charged the university with discrimination against female students in its athletic program in violation of Title IX and the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.
180. No. 80-1362 (E. D. Pa., filed April 8, 1980) (Complaint on file at the Golden
Gate University Law Review Office).
181. Complaint at 1, Rollin Haffer v. Temple Univ., No. 80-1362. See On Campus
With Women, Fall 1980, supra note 113, for a report on the facts of the case.
182. Complaint at 12, 15, 29, Rollin Haffer v. Temple Univ., No. 80-1362.
183. Complaint at 12.
0
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even excluding money allocated to the school's foot"Qall program,
the budget for men's sports exceeded the women's intercollegiate athletic budget by 3.6 to 1, although the ratio of males to
females participating in intercollegiate athletics at Temple was
much closer.ls4 This type of specific data is necessary to support
allegations based on sections A and B of the final policy
interpretation.
In another pending case, Bennett v. West Texas State University/s5 female athletes have brought a class action suit under
Title IX alleging discriminatory practices in areas of scholarship,
travel allowances, compensation and treatment of coaches, provision of locker room, practice, and office facilities, and provision
of publicity, promotion, and awards. ISS Once again, the content
of the allegations is based on sections A and B of the final policy
interpretation. Although these two cases provide examples of initiallitigation strategy, their effectiveness in court is unknown.

It is important that sportswomen who want to participate in
contact sports also seek relief through the courts. The contact
sports exception has been considered unconstitutional as applied
to interscholastic sports in two recent federal court decisions. 187
184. ld. at 31.
185. No. 2-80-73, (N.D. Tex. filed May 22, 1980) (Complaint on file at the Golden
Gate University Law Review Office).
186. Complaint at 56.
187. See Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D.
Wis. 1978); Yellow Springs Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio School Athletic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 753
(S.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 647 F.2d 651 (1981). In Leffel,
plaintiffs were a class composed of all female public high school students in Wisconsin
who wished to participate on public high school varsity athletic teams. They sought a
declaration that a provision of the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association-which
limited coeducational interscholastic activity-violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. They also sought a permanent
injunction enjoining enforcement of the provision. In defense, the athletic association
claimed the provision conformed to the contact sports exception. The court recognized
the contact sports exception but rejected this defense. "The enactment of Title IX did
not remove the problem of sex discrimination from constitutional concern; congressional
enactments cannot preempt provisions of the Constitution." ld. at 1120.
In Yellow Springs, the district court held the contact sports exception deprived
"physically qualified girls of liberty without due process of law." 443 F.2d at 759. The
court noted the stereotype on which many presumptions are based. "It has always been
traditional that 'boys play football and girls are cheerleaders.' Why so? Where is it written that girls may not, if suitably qualified, play football?" ld. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case for retrial, and issued an injunction temporarily forbidding
the school board from enforcing the athletic association's rule. 647 F.2d at 658. The court
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Exceptional female athletes are urged to follow in the wake of
these precedents. Only through consistent court action will Title
IX become an important tool for ending discrimination against
women.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is in the best interests of society to encourage
women to develop their athletic potential, to "appreciate their
physical abilities, and enjoy the mastery of their bodies in sporting activity.m88 One autl;lOr urges an equalitarian approach and
suggests that, "[i]f participation in sport is going to mold leaders, build stamina, heighten competitive spirit, produce physical
fitness, create mental toughness and put students through college, then girls, as well as boys should have equal opportunity to
participate in sport and gain such benefits."189 If women are prevented from participating in those sports which traditionally
draw the largest crowds, have the most capital at their disposal,
and receive the greatest support from the university, they will
not achieve equality.190 They will continue to be discriminated
against in those programs which have the greatest resources for
developing athletic skills.
Had the final policy interpretation incorporated the suggestions of those who urged that specific measures be taken in implementing Title IX,191 equal opportunity may have been asdid not consider whether HEW's regulation itself was unconstitutional. The dissent,
however, did regard separate teams for girls and boys as a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 666 (Jones, J., dissenting).
188. See Duquin, The Androgynous Advantage, in WOMEN AND SPORT, supra note I,
at 97.
189. [d.
190. See Rose, The ERA and Women's Sport: An Hypothetical Trial Case, in WOMAN AND SPORT, supra note I, at 237, in which the author suggests that the separate but
equal model does not achieve true equality due to perpetuation of social barriers. The
existence of separate teams may merely reinforce this cycle.
191. With regard to the proposed policy interpretation, it was stated:
The Title IX regulation specifically authorized a three year
adjustment period (which ended on July I, 1978) for postsecondary institutions to bring their athletic programs into
compliance. This effort should have included attempts to increase participation rates and to improve levels of competition
for women, but the new policy ignores this. Instead it requires
only that inequities affecting present athletes be eliminated
immediately, and that institutions have a policy which permits
expansion of participation and competitive opportunities for
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sured. The statute would have received its intended expression
more readily if the policy specified the rate at which improvements should be made with regard to participation and levels of
competition.192 It should have called for comparable participation rates and levels of competition as targets to be achieved
within a fixed time frame. 19s In addition, the policy should have
clearly stated that institutions are responsible for annually assessing newly developing interests and abilities in order to fulfill
their Title IX obligations.194 By disregarding these proposed
procedures, HEW weakened the statute's general prohibition
against sex discrimination in education.
"
Women must be encouraged to participate in those sports
which, for so many years, have been closed to them. Only then
will the stereotype of the woman as passive spectator begin to
disappear and a new role model, based on athletic achievement,
be emulated. The final policy interpretation, while it does set
forth criteria for determining compliance with Title IX, fails to
strictly regulate those areas where discrimination continues to
exist. The absence of affirmative requirements, combined with
the many loopholes and exceptions, undermines the important
public policy goals which formed the basis of the statute.
Whether or not sportswomen will truly achieve equality in intercollegiate athletics depends both upon their own initiative in
pursuing their rights and the future dispositions of the courts.
Whatever the outcome may be, the female athlete is only beginning to express her spirited involvement in American sport.

women to move forward at an undefined pace. Theoretically
an institution can perpetually continue to plan to increase opportunities for women, and accomplish this at a very slow rate,
and still be in compliance; i.e., an institution can take 20 or 30
years to encourage women and increase their participation in
sports so long that it showed that some progress was being
made.
Update on Title IX and Sports #2, On Campus With Women, supra note 113, at 4; See
YALE NOTE, supra note 4, at 1273-78, which sets forth specific suggestions for alternative
regulations.
192. Update on Title IX and Sports #2, On Campus With Women, supra note 113.
193.Id.
194.Id.
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